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Abstract
Adversarial robustness has become a fundamental requirement in modern machine learning
applications. Yet, there has been surprisingly little statistical understanding so far. In this
paper, we provide the first result of the optimal minimax guarantees for the excess risk for
adversarially robust classification, under Gaussian mixture model proposed by Schmidt et al.
(2018). The results are stated in terms of the Adversarial Signal-to-Noise Ratio (AdvSNR),
which generalizes a similar notion for standard linear classification to the adversarial setting.
For the Gaussian mixtures with AdvSNR value of r, we establish an excess risk lower bound
of order Θ(e−(
1
8+o(1))r
2 d
n ) and design a computationally efficient estimator that achieves this
optimal rate. Our results built upon minimal set of assumptions while cover a wide spectrum of
adversarial perturbations including `p balls for any p ≥ 1.
1 Introduction
Recent years, machine learning algorithms have revolutionized our life due to their tremendous
success in a variety of different domains such as image classification, natural language processing and
strategy games (e.g. Krizhevsky et al. (2012); Bahdanau et al. (2014); Silver et al. (2016)). These
algorithms often achieve extremely accurate performances yet are susceptible to small perturbations
of the inputs. In particular, Szegedy et al. (2013) (among others e.g. Goodfellow et al. (2014);
Papernot et al. (2016)) noticed that small perturbations (nearly imperceptible) to images could
cause neural network classifiers to make wrong predictions with high confidence. While a growing
amount of effort has been made in order to empirically improve the robustness of these learning
algorithms against adversarial attacks, the problems of assessing statistical optimality, understanding
generalization and statistical significance are important but far less understood. In this paper, we
take a step towards this end.
In this work, we consider the adversarially robust classification problem under the Gaussian
mixture model proposed by Schmidt et al. (2018). While the classification for mixture of Gaussian
distributions — which is also referred to as discriminant analysis — has now been standard in
statistics and computer science literature (see, e.g. McLachlan and Peel (2004)), it is only until
recently that researchers start to consider what can go wrong in the adversarial scenarios for this
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simple problem. It turns out (and as is shown in the sequel) that this simple yet instructive model
demonstrates clear tradeoffs between adversarially robustness and the statistical complexities, and
at the same time, capturing some of the features one would encounter in real applications.
Under minimal assumptions of the adversarial perturbations, we provide optimal minimax lower
bounds, and show that a natural computationally efficient estimator achieves these minimax lower
bounds in terms of the adversarial signal to noise ratio. Putting these together gives a sharp
characterization of the intrinsic hardness of this problem in terms of how far one can push towards
a robust estimator without any essential loss of statistical accuracy. These optimal lower and upper
bounds are useful since that they provide a comprehensive view of the adversarially robust sample
complexity of the conditional Gaussian model, which could then be contrasted with that of the
rates of the classical conditional Gaussian model.
Despite of an extensive line of work considering this problem, Schmidt et al. (2018) and Bhagoji et al.
(2019) lie most closely to this paper. In order to obtain tight statistical characterizations of the risk,
they made a number of simplifications, which thus do not directly provide answers to the minimax
sample complexity of the original problem. As one main contrast, they consider the Bayesian setting
where the means of the conditional Gaussians have as prior an independent standard Gaussian
distribution. For other simplifications, Schmidt et al. (2018) considered the spherical models so that
the covariance is identity and also made additional simplifications such as large separation between
two Gaussians and an upper bound on the noise level. These additional assumptions made it hard
to compare with that of the adversary-free scenario. More detailed comparisons and discussions are
provided after our main results.
1.1 Our contributions
The main contributions of this paper are summarized below, all of which are built upon a careful
analysis of the classification error for linear classifiers.
• We develop the first minimax lower bounds for the classification excess risk in the conditional
Gaussian model, stated in Theorem 4.1. In terms of the Adversarial Signal-to-Noise Ratio
(AdvSNR), this excess risk scales as ΩP (exp(−(18 + o(1))r2) dn) for AdvSNR = r, dimension d
and sample size n.
• We construct a computationally efficient estimator based on the solution of a constrained
quadratic optimization problem that has excess risk of order OP (exp(−(18 + o(1))r2) dn). This
result is given in Theorem 3.1. Hence, the upper bound is nearly tight (up to lower order
terms in r) with the minimax lower bound in our regime of interest in terms of AdvSNR r,
dimension d and sample size n .
• The recipe provided herein, works for a wide range of adversarial perturbations, generalizing
the result by Schmidt et al. (2018) who focus only on the `∞-type perturbations.
• Finally, our results are built upon minimum set of assumptions, without assuming strong
separations between two classes, allowing for unknown and arbitrary covariance structure and
the rates are naturally adaptive to the true signal.
2
Our findings unveil new insights into the adversarially robust sample complexity of the conditional
Gaussian model which goes beyond of what the current theory has to offer.
1.2 Other related works
The conditional Gaussian models or mixture of Gaussians has been studied a lot in statistics and
computer science literature. An incomplete and more recent list includes Kim et al. (2006); Azizyan
et al. (2013); Li et al. (2015, 2017); Cai and Zhang (2019). In the context of adversarial robustness,
since the seminal work of Schmidt et al. (2018), there are several other papers that studied the
sample complexity issue in conditional Gaussian models. Bhagoji et al. (2019) also provided a
slightly improved bound in the same setting. Carmon et al. (2019), Stanforth et al. (2019), Zhai
et al. (2019) showed that with the help of unlabeled data, it is possible to achieve high robust
accuracy with the same number of labeled data required for standard learning.
Another line of research study the sample complexity of adversarially robust learning under the
PAC framework, using extensions of Rademacher complexity or VC dimension, including Attias
et al. (2018), Khim and Loh (2018), Yin et al. (2018), Cullina et al. (2018), Montasser et al. (2019),
Awasthi et al. (2020). The tradeoff in standard and robust accuracy has been theoretically and
empirically studied in Zhang et al. (2019), Suggala et al. (2018), Tsipras et al. (2018), Raghunathan
et al. (2020) and Javanmard et al. (2020).
Several previous works analyzed the robustness of specific family of classifiers. The early work
of Xu et al. (2009a,b) estabilished the connections between robust optimization for linear models
and certain types of regularization in classification and regression settings. Subsequently, Xu and
Mannor (2012) also showed that under certain notion of robustness, robust algorithms can generalize
well. Wang et al. (2017) studied the robustness of nearest neighbor classifiers.
From the aspect of computational complexity, some recent works showed that learning a robust
model or even verifying robustness of a given model can be computationally hard, including (Bubeck
et al., 2018a,b) and (Awasthi et al., 2019; Weng et al., 2018).
1.3 Notations
For the reader’s convenience, we list here our notational conventions.
For positive semi-definite matrix A, we use ‖x‖A :=
√
xTAx. Let Φ(·) the CDF of standard Gaussian
distribution N (0, 1) and Φ¯(x) := 1 − Φ(x). The notation f(n, d) = O (g(n, d)) means that there
exits a universal constant c > 0 that does not depend on the problem parameters such as n, d
etc, such that |f(n, d)| ≤ c|g(n, d)|. Similarly, we define f(n, d) = Ω (g(n, d)) when there exist
constants c1, c2 > 0 such that c1|g(n, d)| ≤ |f(n, d)| ≤ c2|g(n, d)|. Notation OP ,ΩP are used if the
corresponding relations happen with probability converges to 1 as n→∞ (see e.g. Chapter 2 of
(Van der Vaart, 2000)). We define the `p norm ‖x‖p = (
∑d
i=1 x
p
i )
1/p and the corresponding `p-ball
as {x ∈ Rd|‖x‖p ≤ 1}.
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2 Preliminaries
This section is devoted to setting up the adversarial robust classification problem that is considered
in this paper. Along the way, we introduce necessary background and state several preliminary
results for future comparisons.
Conditional Gaussian Model We consider the binary classification problem with data pair
(x, y) generated from the mixture of two Gaussian distributions Pµ,Σ,
p(y = 1) =
1
2
, p(y = −1) = 1
2
,
p(x|y) = N (x; yµ,Σ).
Here µ ∈ Rd, Σ ∈ Rd×d,Σ  0 denote the mean and covariance of the Gaussian distribution. Given n
training samples (xi, yi) ∼i.i.d. Pµ,Σ for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the goal is to learn a classifier fˆ(x) for predicting
the class of a future data point that is drawn from the same distribution Pµ,Σ.
Adversarially Robust Classification In the standard setting of classification, the optimal
classifier is defined as the one that which minimizes the population classification error
Rstdµ,Σ(f) := E(x,y)∼Pµ,Σ
[
I(f(x) 6= y)] .
which we refer to the standard error throughout. In this paper, we consider the classification
problem under conditional Gaussian generative model in presence of an adversary — which is to
say — at the testing stage, an adversary is allowed to add any perturbation δ to the input x, that
has bounded magnitude ‖δ‖B ≤ ε. The norm defined here is the standard Minkowski functional
that associated with a convex set Thompson and Thompson (1996). Formally, given a closed and
origin-symmetric convex set B, the Minkowski functional is defined as
‖x‖B := inf{λ ∈ R>0 : x ∈ λB}.
For instance, when B is the `p unit ball, then ‖x‖B boils down to the classical `p norm of x. In
practice, the most widely considered norm for the adversary are `∞ and `2 norms.
In the adversarially robust setting, a mapping f : Rd → {−1,+1} classifies a sample (x, y) correctly,
if and only if the prediction agrees with the true label for all possible perturbations of the adversary.
To put it in mathematical form,
`B,ε(f ;x, y) := I
(∃δ : ‖δ‖B ≤ ε, f(x+ δ) 6= y) .
Our goal is to obtain a classifier with minimal expected robust classification error, i.e. finding
mapping f that minimizes
RB,εµ,Σ(f) = E(x,y)∼Pµ,Σ [`B,ε(f ;x, y)]
= E(x,y)∼Pµ,Σ [I
(∃‖δ‖B ≤ ε, f(x+ δ) 6= y)]. (1)
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The optimal risk is then defined as the classification error regarding the optimal classifier, namely
RB,εµ,Σ∗ := RB,εµ,Σ(f∗), (2)
and accordingly, we define the excess risk of any classifier f as
RB,εµ,Σ(f)−RB,εµ,Σ∗, (3)
which by definition is always non-negative.
Robust Bayes Optimal Classifier To motivate the robust optimal classifiers, we start our
discussion with the optimal risk and optimal classifier in the conditional Gaussian Model. We note
that when ε = 0, i.e. there is no adversary, the classification problem reduces to the well-known
Fisher’s Linear Discriminant Analysis problem, where the Bayes optimal classifier is a simple linear
classifier
fBayes(x) = sign(µ
Tx),
known as Fisher’s linear discriminant rule (see, e.g. Johnson et al. (2002)). The Bayes optimal
classifier minimizes the misclassification rate. However, the classifier that minimizes the robust
classification error is not known until recently, where Bhagoji et al. (2019) provided a tight lower
bound on the minimal robust classification error via optimal transport techniques. It is also proved
that the optimal risk can be written as the optimal value of a convex program, and the oracle
optimal classifier is a linear classifier that has a closed form given the solution of the convex program.
We find it is useful to first simplify and restate this result in order to set the stage for our main
result.
Theorem 2.1 (Restated and simplified from Bhagoji et al. (2019)). Let zΣ(µ) be the solution of
the following convex program:
zΣ(µ) = argmin
‖z‖B≤ε
‖µ− z‖2Σ−1 , (4)
where ‖x‖A =
√
xTAx. 1Then, the optimal robust classifier for Pµ,Σ is a linear classifier f∗(x) =
sign(wT0 x), where
w0 := Σ
−1(µ− zΣ(µ)), (5)
and the optimal robust classification error is
RB,εµ,Σ∗ := Φ¯(‖w0‖Σ) = Φ¯(‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖Σ−1).
We remark that the above mentioned classifier is indeed an oracle classifier since it is constructed
using the unknown parameters µ and Σ.
1Note that this notation is different with Bhagoji et al. (2019), where in their notation ‖x‖A =
√
xTA−1x.
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Adversarial Signal-To-Noise Ratio (AdvSNR). In the context of standard classification in
the conditional Gaussian model, the notion of Signal-To-Noise Ratio was introduced to measure
the effective separation which is defined as the Mahalanobis distance between the means of two
conditional distributions.
Definition 2.1 (Standard Signal-To-Noise Ratio). The Standard Signal-To-Noise Ratio (StdSNR)
of conditional Gaussian model Pµ,Σ is defined as
StdSNR(µ,Σ) := 2‖µ‖Σ−1 .
Here, the constant 2 is introduced to be consistent with the literature in Fisher’s LDA, e.g. Cai
and Zhang (2019), where SNR is defined as the Mahalanobis distance between means of two
mixture components. We make the note that the StdSNR measures the difficulty of standard
classification in the conditional Gaussian model, since the minimal misclassification error equals to
Φ¯(12StdSNR(µ,Σ)) Cai and Zhang (2019). In fact, the misclassification error decreases exponentially
as the StdSNR increases.
When it comes to the adversarial setting, StdSNR, however, is no longer a proper metric for the
classification difficulty. Specifically, conditional Gaussian models with the same StdSNR can have
very different levels of hardness in the adversarially robust classification problem. In order to
illustrate this, we demonstrate a simple example.
Example 2.1. Consider an adversary which is allowed to perturb the input with budget ε = 6√
d
in
terms the `∞ norm. Set the covariance Σ to be the identity matrix Id. We examine two conditional
Gaussian models, Pµ1,Σ and Pµ2,Σ with different means µ1 and µ2, where
µ1 =
6√
d
· (1, 1, 1, · · · , 1)T , µ2 = (6, 0, 0, · · · , 0)T .
It is easily seen that ‖µ1‖Σ−1 = ‖µ2‖Σ−1 = 6, therefore Pµ1,Σ and Pµ2,Σ have the same StdSNR.
However, by Theorem 2.1, these two distributions actually exhibit completely different minimal
robust classification error, indeed,
RB,εµ1,Σ = Φ¯(0) =
1
2
, RB,εµ2,Σ = Φ¯(6−
6√
d
).
When the dimension d is sufficiently large, the optimal risk RB,εµ2,Σ approaches Φ¯(6) ≈ 10−8, which
means there exists a very good robust classifier for Pµ2,Σ. In contrast, the optimal risk R
B,ε
µ1,Σ
= 12 ,
i.e. no classifier can achieve a robust accuracy better than a uninformative predictor that classifies
everything as the same class. From this simple example, it is safe to conclude that StdSNR is not
an ideal measurement for the difficulty in the adversarially robust classification problem.
To address the above issue, one need a proper definition of the signal-to-noise-ratio that is suitable
for the adversarial robust setting. Therefore we introduce the Adversarial Signal-To-Noise Ratio
(AdvSNR) for any (B, ε) adversary.
Definition 2.2 (Adversarial Signal-To-Noise Ratio). Define the (B, ε) Adversarial Signal-To-Noise
Ratio (AdvSNR) of conditional Gaussian model Pµ,Σ as
AdvSNRB,ε(µ,Σ) := 2‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖Σ−1 = 2‖w0‖Σ,
where w0 is defined in (5).
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As a consequence of Theorem 2.1, the minimal robust classification error satisfies
RB,εµ,Σ∗ = Φ¯
(
1
2
AdvSNR(µ,Σ)
)
. (6)
Consequently, the AdvSNR fully characterizes the difficulty for the adversarially robust setting
as the StdSNR in the standard setting. We also note that when ε = 0, i.e. there is no adversary,
the AdvSNR reduces to the traditional definition of the StdSNR. Thus, AdvSNR is a reasonable
generalization for StdSNR.
Naturally, for every r > 0, one can consider a class of distributions where each of them has the
same (B, ε)-AdvSNR equal to r. Within each class, they should enjoy the same hardness of the
classification problem. Formally, let us define the class DB,ε(r).
Definition 2.3. The family of conditional Gaussian models with (B, ε)-AdvSNR value of r, is
defined as:
DB,ε(r) := {(µ,Σ)|AdvSNRB,ε(µ,Σ) = r}.
In the sequel, we develop our minimax lower bounds over these classes of distributions. To assist
our analysis, we also define the family of conditional Gaussian models with a standard SNR value
of r similarly.
Definition 2.4. The family of conditional Gaussian models with a standard SNR value of r, is
defined as:
Dstd(r) := {(µ,Σ)|StdSNR(µ,Σ) = r}.
In the derivations of our upper bounds and minimax lower bounds, we make the assumption that
the AdvSNR r is strictly bounded away from zero by a universal constant 2, otherwise as a result of
Theorem 2.1, no classifier can achieve accuracy much better than 12 , the robust risk of a constant
classifier f(x) ≡ 1.
3 A Coputationally Efficient Estimator and Risk Upper Bound
Thus far, we introduce the notion of AdvSNR which is known to characterize the minimal robust
classification error as in expression (6). However, whether there exists a computation-efficient
classifier that behaves similarly to the oracle best classifier is still unclear.
This section, we aim to answer this question in the affirmative by constructing such a classifier.
For the classifier that we shall define in the sequel, we give an exact characterization of its excess
robust classification error compared with the oracle best classifier. Motivated by the fact that the
optimal robust classifier has the form of (5), we design a ”plug-in” estimator for w0. The estimator
is described in the following algorithm.
2for instance, r ≥ 10−9
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Algorithm 1 A plug-in estimator of w0
Input: Data pairs {(xi, yi)}ni=1.
Output: ŵ.
Step 1: Define µ̂ and Σ̂ as
µ̂ :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
yixi, Σ̂ :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
xix
T
i − µ̂µ̂T .
Step 2: Solve for ẑ in the following
ẑ := z
Σ̂
(µ̂) = argmin
‖z‖B≤ε
‖µ̂− z‖2
Σ̂−1 .
Step 3: Define ŵ := Σ̂−1(µ̂− ẑ).
The main theorem of this section is to characterize the excess risk bound of the classifier induced by
ŵ.
Theorem 3.1. For the (‖ · ‖B, ε) adversary, suppose the adversarial signal-to-noise ratio
AdvSNRB,ε(µ,Σ) = r, then the excess risk of fŵ is upper bounded by
RB,εµ,Σ(fŵ)−RB,εµ,Σ∗ ≤ OP
(
e−
1
8
r2 · r · d
n
)
.
We take a moment to make several remarks. First recall that the AdvSNR is defined as a measurement
for the hardness of the classification problem. Indeed, as the above result shows, the excess risk
vanishes exponentially with the AdvSNR. Moreover, our estimator is adaptive in the sense that
it does not require knowing any information about the value of r, but the theoretical guarantee
improves automatically with larger AdvSNRs. We also note that the dependency with sample size
n is O
(
1
n
)
, which is the same as the rate of Fisher’s LDA, but faster than the typical O
(
1√
n
)
rate.
Comparisons to Schmidt et al. (2018) We note that our result generalizes the one showed in
Schmidt et al. (2018) in many different aspects:
1. In terms of the perturbations, Schmidt et al. (2018) considered perturbations in `∞ balls,
while ours allow for any convex, closed and origin-symmentric perturbaion set B, including all
`p balls for p ≥ 1.
2. Our upper and lower bounds hold for both spherical and non-spherical Gaussians, without
the knowledge of the population covariance structure.
3. We impose no restrictions on the separation between Gaussian distributions. Schmidt et al.
(2018) studied a very specific regime, where the budget of `∞ adversary is bounded by 14 , the
separation between the means of two Gaussians is
√
d, and the spherical covariance matrix
Σ = σ2I satisfies σ ≤ 132d1/4. This regime is low-noise by design, while our analysis applies to
any regime whenever there exists a classifier with robust accuracy slightly better than 12 .
4. Our estimator is consistent, i.e. the excess risk converges to zero as sample size n→∞. The
classifier used in Schmidt et al. (2018) is actually sign(µˆTx). While this classifier achieve
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Figure 1: A simple simulation on the performance of Algorithm 1 and the algorithm proposed
in (Schmidt et al., 2018) is shown here with different values of AdvSNR r. Here we consider a
50-dimensional example under `∞ adversary with ε = 0.1. The covariance matrix is fixed to be
Σ = I, and the mean parameter µ is set as µ = (r + ε, ε, ε, · · · , ε) for r ∈ {0.5, 1.0, 2.0}. We
evaluate the excess risk RB,εµ,Σ(fŵ) − RB,εµ,Σ∗ returned by the two algorithms using n i.i.d. training
data pairs, where n ∈ {50, 100, 200, 400, 800, 1600, 3200, 6400, 12800}. For each combination of (n, r),
the averaged excess risk over 10 random repetitions is reported respectively.
near-optimal classification error in the regime of their interst (the low noise regime mentioned
above with Gaussian prior on µ), the excess risk does not converge to zero in general. This
is due to the fact that the large-sample limit of their classifier is actually sign(µTx), i.e. the
Bayes optimal classifier for the standard setting. As we can see from Theorem 2.1 and a
simple simulation in Figure 1, the excess risk of their algorithm saturates at a level above zero,
which is very different from the behavior of Algorithm 1.
Proof Sketch: Here we provide a brief sketch of the proof. More details can be found in the
Section 6.
Step 1: First order approximation of the risk. Since both the learned fwˆ and the optimal
robust classifier f∗ are linear classifiers, we can calculate the robust excess risk in closed form using
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Lemma 6.2 (also shown in Bhagoji et al. (2019)):
RB,εµ,Σ(fŵ)−RB,εµ,Σ∗ = Φ¯
(
ŵTµ− ε‖ŵ‖B∗
‖ŵ‖Σ
)
− Φ¯(1
2
r).
By the Taylor expansion of Φ¯(·), we have
Φ¯
(
ŵTµ− ε‖ŵ‖B∗
‖ŵ‖Σ
)
− Φ¯(1
2
r) ≈ 1√
2pi
e−
1
8
r2δn,
where
δn =
1
2
r − ŵ
Tµ− ε‖ŵ‖B∗
‖ŵ‖Σ .
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that δn = OP (r · dn).
Step 2: Controlling δn. To give an upper bound of δn, we will use the fact that sample mean µ̂
and sample covariace Σ̂ converge to µ and Σ respectively. Furthermore, the convergence rate is well
known as OP (
√
d
n).
From a high level, the upper bound of δn is estabished (see Lemma 6.3) by carefully decomposing
δn into four terms and each term is in the form of the differences between population and sample
quantities like Σ vs Σ̂, µ̂ vs µ. Invoking the convergence rates of µ̂ and Σ̂, we are able to bound
each of these terms and complete the proof.
4 Minimax Lower Bounds
This section is dedicated to developing minimax excess risk lower bounds for the adversarially robust
classification with conditional Gaussian models.
As is mentioned above, we consider a class of distributionsDB,ε(r) which have the same AdvSNRB,ε =
r, as in Definition 2.3. As quantity AdvSNR characterizes the minimal robust classification error, this
class of distributions DB,ε(r) all share the same adversarially robust classification error. Therefore,
our lower bounds here measure the fundamental information-theoretic limit of this problem, namely,
no estimator can achieve an essential improvement in terms of the adversarial classification error.
Theorem 4.1. Let f̂ be any estimator based on n samples (x1, y1), · · · , (xn, yn) ∼i.i.d. Pµ,Σ. We
have the following lower bound on the minimax excess risk:
min
f̂
max
(µ,Σ)∈DB,ε(r)
[RB,εµ,Σ(f̂)−RB,εµ,Σ∗] ≥ ΩP
(
e−(
1
8
+o(1))r2 d
n
)
.
Putting together with the upper bound in Theorem 3.1, this lower bound matches almost exactly
with the upper bound in the regime of interest, therefore they are both optimal up to lower order
terms.
The main technique we used for this lower bound is with a flavor of black-box reduction. In
particular, we show that the minimax robust excess risk in DB,ε(r) cannot be smaller than the
minimax standard excess risk in Dstd(r). In other words,
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Lemma 4.1. The minimax excess error satisfies
min
f̂
max
(µ,Σ)∈DB,ε(r)
[RB,εµ,Σ(f̂)−RB,εµ,Σ∗] ≥ min
f̂
max
(µ′,Σ)∈Dstd(r)
[Rstdµ′,Σ(f̂)−Rstdµ′,Σ∗].
The right hand side of (7), i.e. the minimax rate for standard classification, is well-studied in the
existing literature of Fisher’s LDA. For example, Li et al. (2017) proved the following lower bound:
Theorem 4.2 (Theorem 1 of Li et al. (2017)). Suppose the covariance matrix satisfies Σ = I and
is known to the learner, then we have the minimax lower bound
min
f̂
max
(µ′,I)∈Dstd(r)
[Rstdµ′,Σ(f̂)−Rstdµ′,Σ∗] ≥ ΩP
(
e−
1
8
r2 · 1
r
· d
n
)
.
Since the parameter space considered in Li et al. (2017) is a subset of Dstd(r), we have (7) is also
lower bounded by ΩP
(
e−
1
8
r2 · 1r · dn
)
, therefore proves Theorem 4.1.
Comparisons to Schmidt et al. (2018) and Bhagoji et al. (2019) To the best of our
knowlege, Theorem 4.1 is the first minimax-type lower bound in adversarially robust classification.
Existing works Schmidt et al. (2018) and Bhagoji et al. (2019) also studied the sample complexity
of robust learning in conditional Gaussian model. However, both of them simplified the problem
and considered the case when µ follows from a prior distribution N (0, I). This assumption is crucial
to their analysis, otherwise the posterior distribution of µ given training data is intractable. Hence,
the technical tool used in prior works is not sufficient for developing such a minimax lower bound of
our interest.
Proof Sketch: Here we also provide a proof sketch to Lemma 4.1. More details can be found in
the Section 6.
Step 1: Connecting standard and robust risks In Lemma 6.4, we prove that for any classifier
f and a perturbed distribution Pµ′,Σ, where ‖µ′ − µ‖B ≤ ε, the robust risk of f on Pµ,Σ is always
lower bounded by the standard risk on Pµ′,Σ.
As a consequence, in Corollary 6.1 we show that if we choose µ′ = µ− zΣ(µ), then the robust excess
risk of f on Pµ,Σ is always lower bounded by the standard excess risk on Pµ′,Σ.
Step 2: A mapping fron Dstd(r) to DB,ε(r) To prove Lemma 4.1, we only need to answer the
following question: for any (µ′,Σ) ∈ Dstd(r), can we find a (µ,Σ) ∈ DB,ε(r), so that the robust
excess risk on Pµ,Σ is always lower bounded by the standard excess risk on Pµ′,Σ? We give an
affirmative answer to this question. The proof in a combination of Corollary 6.1 showed in Step 1
and an examination of optimality condition in the optimization problem 4.
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5 Comparing Adversarial and Standard Rates
Putting the upper and lower bounds together provides a comprehensive view of the statistical
aspect of the adversarially robust classification. A key question to ask is that: How much does the
classification error blows up as the price of being adversarially robust?
To answer this question, it is sufficient to compare the optimal risks in both cases. Informally, one
can write the logarithm ratio between two rates as
log
(
AdvRate
StdRate
)
≈ 1
2
(
‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖2Σ−1 − ‖µ‖2Σ−1
)
. (7)
From the definition of zΣ(µ) in (4), we can see that ‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖2Σ−1 ≤ ‖µ‖2Σ−1 , hence adversarial
rate is always slower.
To analyze this difference quantitively and interpretably, we consider the special case where Σ = I
and the adversary is `2 bounded. Similar results hold for other adversaries as well. The key
observation is that depending on the different scale of ‖µ‖2 and the budget of perturbation ε, this
difference can be as small as O(1), or as large as Ω(exp(d)).
Proposition 5.1. When Σ = I and the adversarial perturbation satisfies ‖δ‖2 ≤ ε, then
• When ε ≤ O( 1‖µ‖2 ), the adversarial rate is at most O(1) times slower than the standard rate.
• When ‖µ‖2 ≥ Ω(log d) and ε ≥ Ω( log d‖µ‖2 ), the adversarial rate can be slower than the standard
rate by a poly(d) factor.
• When ‖µ‖2 ≥ Ω(
√
d) and ε ≥ Ω( d‖µ‖2 ), the adversarial rate can be slower than the standard
rate by an exp(d) factor.
In general, the difference is more significant when ε or ‖µ‖2 is larger. This example demonstrates a
clear tradeoff between being adversarial robust and obtaining the optimal accuracy, in particular in
the case of large perturbations.
6 Proofs and further details
In this section, we provide detailed proofs for our main results. The proof details of some lemmas
are deferred to our supplementary file.
6.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Before presenting our analysis, we first state a standard lemma about the convergence of empirical
mean and covariance.
Lemma 6.1 (Convergence of the empirical mean and covariance (see, e.g. Wainwright (2019))).
The convergence rates of the empirical mean µ̂ and Σ̂ to the corresponding ground truth satisfy
‖µ̂− µ‖Σ−1 = OP
(√
d
n
)
,
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and
‖Σ− 12 Σ̂Σ− 12 − I‖op = OP
(√
d
n
)
.
The following lemma about the classification error of linear classifiers will also be useful for us.
Lemma 6.2 (Robust classification error of linear classifier, (see e.g. in Bhagoji et al. (2019),
Appendix B.3)). For a linear classifier fw(x) = sign(w
Tx), the robust classification error with a
B, ε adversary is
RB,εµ,Σ(fw) = Φ¯
(
wTµ− ε‖w‖B∗
‖w‖Σ
)
.
Here, ‖ · ‖B∗ is the dual norm of ‖ · ‖B. We use RB,εµ,Σ(w) as a shorthand for RB,εµ,Σ(fw) when the
meaning is clear from context.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. By Lemma 6.2 and Taylor expansion of Φ¯(t) around t = 12r = ‖w0‖Σ, the
excess risk can be written as:
RB,εµ,Σ(ŵ)−RB,εµ,Σ∗ = Φ¯
(
ŵTµ− ε‖ŵ‖B∗
‖ŵ‖Σ
)
− Φ¯(‖w0‖Σ)
=
1√
2pi
e−
1
8
r2δn +O(δ
2
n),
where
δn = ‖w0‖Σ − ŵ
Tµ− ε‖ŵ‖B∗
‖ŵ‖Σ .
Therefore, to analyze the convergence rate of the excess risk, we only need to analyze the convergence
rate of δn. We would like to prove that
δn = OP
(
r · d
n
)
.
The following lemma is the key of our analysis: it decomposes δn into four terms, each in the form
of the difference between population and sample quantities like Σ vs Σ̂, µ̂ vs µ.
Lemma 6.3. We have the following decomposition for δn:
‖ŵ‖Σδn = −1
2
(‖w0‖Σ − ‖ŵ‖Σ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+wT0 (ẑ − zΣ(µ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
−1
2
‖ẑ − zΣ(µ)‖2Σ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
+
1
2
‖(Σ− Σ̂)ŵ + (µ̂− µ)‖2Σ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
T4
.
where zˆ is the shorthand for zˆ = z
Σ̂
(µ̂).
The proof of Lemma 6.3 is provided in Appendix D. Based on this decomposition, our goal is to
establish the following relations.
T1 ≤ 0, T2 ≤ 0, T3 ≤ 0, T4 ≤ OP
(
r2
d
n
)
.
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It is obvious that T1 ≤ 0, T3 ≤ 0. For the second term T2, consider φ(z) = ‖µ − z‖2Σ−1 . Since
zΣ(µ) = argmin‖z‖B≤ε ‖µ− z‖2Σ−1 = argmin‖z‖B≤ε φ(z) , by the first order optimality condition, we
have (z − zΣ(µ))T∇φ(zΣ(µ)) ≤ 0 holds for any ‖z‖B ≤ ε. Choosing z = zˆ gives:
(µ− zΣ(µ))TΣ−1(ẑ − zΣ(µ)) ≤ 0⇔ wT0 (ẑ − zΣ(µ)) ≤ 0.
Therefore, T2 ≤ 0 as we desired.
The remaining work is to prove that T4 ≤ OP
(
(1 + r)2 dn
)
. By triangle’s inequality,
‖(Σ− Σ̂)ŵ + (µ̂− µ)‖Σ−1 ≤ ‖(Σ− Σ̂)ŵ‖Σ−1 + ‖µ̂− µ‖Σ−1 .
Both terms can be controled using covergence of sample mean and covariance. By Lemma 6.1, one
has
‖µ̂− µ‖Σ−1 ≤ OP
(√
d
n
)
,
and direct calculations give
‖(Σ− Σ̂)ŵ‖Σ−1 = ‖(I − Σ−
1
2 Σ̂Σ−
1
2 )(Σ
1
2 ŵ)‖2
≤ ‖I − Σ− 12 Σ̂Σ− 12 ‖op‖Σ 12 ŵ‖2
= OP
(√
d
n
)
‖ŵ‖Σ.
Combined pieces together, triangle’s inequality further guarantees that
‖(Σ− Σ̂)ŵ + (µ̂− µ)‖Σ−1 ≤ OP
(√
d
n
(‖ŵ‖Σ + 1)
)
.
Since µ̂→ µ, Σ̂→ Σ, we have ŵ → w0, therefore ‖ŵ‖Σ = (1 + o(1))‖w0‖Σ = (12 + o(1))r, hence,
T4 =
1
2
‖(Σ− Σ̂)ŵ + (µ̂− µ)‖2Σ−1
≤ 1
2
(
OP (
√
d
n
)(‖ŵ‖Σ + 1)
)2
= OP
(
r2 · d
n
)
.
Putting things together and recall that r = Ω(1), we have
δn = OP
(
r · d
n
)
.
Therefore we have completed the proof.
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6.2 Proof of Lemma 4.1
To prove Lemma 4.1, we start with a simple observation: for any classifier f , its standard error on
any perturbed distribution Pµ′,Σ is always a lower bound on robust error of the original distribution
Pµ,Σ, as long as the perturbation has bounded B-norm ‖µ′ − µ‖B ≤ ε:
Lemma 6.4. For any classifier f : Rd → {−1,+1} and any µ′ ∈ Rd, ‖µ′ − µ‖B ≤ ε
RB,εµ,Σ(f) ≥ Rstdµ′,Σ(f).
Proof. By the definition of robust classification error (1), we can decompose the error into two parts:
the error on positive class (y = 1) and negative class (y = −1), namely,
RB,εµ,Σ(f) =E(x,y)∼Pµ,Σ [I
(∃‖δ‖B ≤ ε, f(x+ δ) 6= y)]
=
1
2
Ex∼N(µ,Σ)[I
(∃‖δ‖B ≤ ε, f(x+ δ) 6= 1)] + 1
2
Ex∼N(−µ,Σ)[I
(∃‖δ‖B ≤ ε, f(x+ δ) 6= −1)].
(8)
By choosing the adversarial perurbation as δ = µ′ − µ, we have the error on positive class is lower
bounded by:
Ex∼N(µ,Σ)[I
(∃‖δ‖B ≤ ε, f(x+ δ) 6= 1)] ≥Ex∼N(µ,Σ)[I (f(x− µ+ µ′) 6= 1)]
=Ex′∼N(µ′,Σ)[I
(
f(x′) 6= 1)]. (9)
Similarly, by choosing δ = µ− µ′, we have the error on negative class is lower bounded by:
Ex∼N(−µ,Σ)[I
(∃‖δ‖B ≤ ε, f(x+ δ) 6= 1)] ≥ Ex′∼N(−µ′,Σ)[I (f(x′) 6= −1)].
Hence, combining (8) , (9) and (10), we get
RB,εµ,Σ(f) ≥
1
2
Ex′∼N(µ′,Σ)[I
(
f(x′) 6= 1)] + 1
2
Ex′∼N(−µ′,Σ)[I
(
f(x′) 6= −1)]
=Rstdµ′,Σ(f),
where the last step is by the definition of standard error (2). Therefore we have completed the
proof.
Next, we show more connections between robust and standard classification. Namely, the robust
Bayes classifier of Pµ,Σ coincides with the standard Bayes classifier of Pµ−zΣ(µ),Σ, as stated in the
following Lemma:
Lemma 6.5. Let zΣ(µ) be the solution of (4), then the robust Bayes classifier of Pµ,Σ, f∗(x) =
sign(wT0 x), satisfies the following conditions:
1. RB,εµ,Σ(f∗) = R
std
µ−zΣ(µ),Σ(f∗).
2. f∗ is the standard Bayes Optimal Classifier of Pµ−zΣ(µ),Σ.
Proof. Note that by setting ε = 0 in Theorem 2.1, we get the characterization of the standard Bayes
error and Bayes optimal classifier for conditional Gaussian models. Applying this result for the
distribution Pµ−zΣ(µ),Σ, we have
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1. The standard Bayes Optimal Classifier of Pµ−zΣ(µ),Σ is sign((µ − zΣ(µ))TΣ−1x), which is
exactly f∗(x).
2. The standard Bayes error of of Pµ−zΣ(µ),Σ is Φ¯(
√
(µ− zΣ(µ))TΣ−1(µ− zΣ(µ))), which is
exactly RB,εµ,Σ∗.
Hence we have completed the proof.
As a direct consequence of Lemma 6.4 and Lemma 6.5, we have the robust excess risk under Pµ,Σ is
lower bounded by the standard excess risk under Pµ−zΣ(µ),Σ:
Corollary 6.1. For any classifier f : Rd → {−1,+1},
RB,εµ,Σ(f)−RB,εµ,Σ∗ ≥ Rstdµ−zΣ(µ),Σ(f)−Rstdµ−zΣ(µ),Σ(f∗)
= Rstdµ−zΣ(µ),Σ(f)−Rstdµ−zΣ(µ),Σ∗,
where
Rstdµ′,Σ∗ = infg R
std
µ′,Σ(g)
is the optimal standard risk.
The last piece of tool needed for proving Lemma 4.1 is a mapping from Dstd(r) to DB,ε(r) that
keeps the excess risk non-decreasing. This is established via the following lemma:
Lemma 6.6. For any (µ′,Σ) ∈ Dstd(r), there exists (µ,Σ) ∈ DB,ε(r), such that µ − zΣ(µ) = µ′,
here zΣ(µ) is the optimal solution of (4).
Proof. The proof is constructive: we choose µ = µ′ + z˜Σ(µ′), where z˜Σ(µ′) is the maximizer of the
following convex program (which is maximizing a linear function over a convex set):
z˜Σ(µ
′) = argmax
‖z‖B≤ε
µ′TΣ−1z. (10)
We want to prove that µ− zΣ(µ) = µ′. By our choice of µ, we also have µ = µ′ + z˜Σ(µ′). Hence, we
only need to prove that
z˜Σ(µ
′) = zΣ(µ).
In other words, we only need to show that z˜Σ(µ
′) is the minimizer of (4).
Since (4) is a convex program with a strongly convex objective, it suffices to prove the following
first order optimality condition holds for any ∀‖z′‖B ≤ ε:
(µ− z˜Σ(µ′))TΣ−1(z′ − z˜Σ(µ′)) ≤ 0.
Since µ− z˜Σ(µ′) = µ′, the inequality is equivalent to:
µ′TΣ−1z′ ≤ µ′TΣ−1z˜Σ(µ′),
which is correct by the definition of z˜Σ(µ
′). Hence we have completed the proof.
Equipped with Lemma 6.6, now we can prove the important lemma:
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Proof of Lemma 4.1. By Lemma 6.6, for any (µ′,Σ) ∈ Dstd(r), there exists (µ,Σ) ∈ DB,ε(r), such
that µ − zΣ(µ) = µ′, where zΣ(µ) is the optimal solution of (4). By Corollary 6.1, we have the
following inequality holds for any fixed f̂ :
Rstdµ′,Σ(f̂)−Rstdµ′,Σ∗ ≤ Rµ,Σ(f̂)−RB,εµ,Σ ∗ .
Therefore,
Rstdµ′,Σ(f̂)−Rstdµ′,Σ∗ ≤ max
(µ,Σ)∈DB,ε(r)
[Rµ,Σ(f̂)−RB,εµ,Σ∗].
holds for all (µ,Σ) ∈ DB,ε(r), which means
max
(µ,Σ)∈DB,ε(r)
[RB,εµ,Σ(f̂)−RB,εµ,Σ∗] ≥ max
(µ′,Σ)∈Dstd(r)
[Rstdµ′,Σ(f̂)−Rstdµ′,Σ∗].
Then, taking minimum over f̂ on both sides proves the theorem.
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A Proof of Theorem 2.1
For completeness, in this section, we present the proof of Theorem 2.1. This result follows from
combining Theorem 1, Theorem 2 and Lemma 1 in Bhagoji et al. (2019). The proof is mainly a
simplified presentation of their proofs (e.g. without using the language of optimal transport) which
make some of their results explicit to interpret for our case (e.g. they did not provide the expression
for optimal linear classifier, which is useful to our algorithmic results).
To start with, let us define w1 :=
w0
‖w0‖Σ =
Σ−1(µ−zΣ(µ))
‖µ−zΣ(µ)‖Σ−1 be the normalized version of w0 so that‖w1‖Σ = 1. The following lemma is implicit in Bhagoji et al. (2019):
Lemma A.1. Suppose we define
G(z, w) = wT (µ− z),
then (zΣ(µ), w1) is solution of the following minimax optimization problem:
min
‖z‖B≤ε
max
‖w‖Σ≤1
G(z, w). (11)
Proof. We first show that the optimal value of the inner maximization problem can be written as:
max
‖w‖Σ≤1
wT (µ− z) = ‖µ− z‖Σ−1 , (12)
and the maximum is achieved when
w =
Σ−1(µ− z)
‖µ− z‖Σ−1
. (13)
In fact, for any w such that ‖w‖Σ ≤ 1, Cauchy-Schwarz inequality gives
wT (µ− z) = (Σ1/2w)TΣ−1/2(µ− z) ≤ ‖Σ1/2w‖2‖Σ−1/2(µ− z)‖2
= ‖w‖Σ‖µ− z‖Σ−1
≤ ‖µ− z‖Σ−1 .
Furthermore, it is easy to check that the choice w = Σ
−1(µ−z)
‖µ−z‖Σ−1 directly yields w
T (µ−z) = ‖µ−z‖Σ−1
achieving the equality. Therefore we have proved (12) and (13).
Using (12), the minimax problem (11) therefore simplifies to:
min
‖z‖B≤ε
‖µ− z‖Σ−1 .
Recall that we define zΣ(µ) (cf. (4)) as
zΣ(µ) = argmin
‖z‖B≤ε
‖µ− z‖2Σ−1 ,
which is the optimal solution to this outer minimization problem. Combining with the optimality
condition for the inner maximization (13), we conclude that (zΣ(µ), w1) is solution of the minimax
problem (11) and complete the proof.
Corollary A.1. The following relation is satisfied for quantities w1 and zΣ(µ):
wT1 µ− ε‖w1‖B∗ = ‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖Σ−1 .
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Proof. Since G(z, w) is linear in both z and w and both constraint sets {‖z‖B ≤ ε} and {‖w‖Σ ≤ 1}
are convex, the minimax problem (11) satisfies strong duality by Von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem.
In other words, we can switch the order of the min and max, namely,
min
‖z‖B≤ε
max
‖w‖Σ≤1
G(z, w) = max
‖w‖Σ≤1
min
‖z‖B≤ε
G(z, w),
and (zΣ(µ), w1) is the solution to both sides. By the stationary condition of the minimax problem,
zΣ(µ) = argmin
‖z‖B≤ε
G(z, w1).
By the definition of dual norm, we also have
min
‖z‖B≤ε
G(z, w1) = min‖z‖B≤ε
wT1 (µ− z) = wT1 µ− ε‖w1‖B∗.
Hence,
‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖Σ−1 = G(zΣ(µ), w1) = min‖z‖B≤εG(z, w1) = w
T
1 µ− ε‖w1‖B∗.
Thus we completed the proof.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. The proof can be divided into two parts:
1. Show that fw0 has robust risk R
B,ε
µ,Σ(fw0) = Φ¯(‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖Σ−1).
2. Show that no classifier can achieve robust risk smaller than Φ¯(‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖Σ−1).
The first part is a consequence of Corollary A.1. In order to see this, we first note that since w1 is a
rescaling of w0, the induced linear classifiers are the same, hence,
RB,εµ,Σ(fw0) = R
B,ε
µ,Σ(fw1).
By Lemma 6.2, the robust risk of fw1 is
RB,εµ,Σ(fw1) = Φ¯(
wT1 µ− ε‖w1‖B∗
‖w1‖Σ ) = Φ¯(w
T
1 µ− ε‖w1‖B∗).
By Corollary A.1,
Φ¯(wT1 µ− ε‖w1‖B∗) = Φ¯(‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖Σ−1).
Therefore, we have proved the first part.
For the second part, we invoke Lemma 6.4. By setting µ′ = µ− zΣ(µ) in Lemma 6.4, we have that
for any classifier f ,
RB,εµ,Σ(f) ≥ Rstdµ−zΣ(µ),Σ(f).
We also know that no classifier can achieve standard risk smaller than the Bayes Risk in Pµ−zΣ(µ),Σ.
Recall that for a conditional Gaussian kmodel Pµ′,Σ, the standard Bayes Risk is Φ¯(‖µ′‖Σ−1). In
other words, for any classifier f , we have
Rstdµ−zΣ(µ),Σ(f) ≥ Φ¯(‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖Σ−1).
Combining the two inequalities, we conclude that
RB,εµ,Σ(f) ≥ Φ¯(‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖Σ−1) (14)
holds for all classifiers f . Therefore, we prove the second part and thus complete the proof.
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B Proof of Proposition 5.1
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Recall that the setting of interest here is Σ = I and ‖ · ‖B corresponds to
the `2 norm. In this setting, we show that zΣ(µ) has a simplified form. In fact, directly invoking
zΣ(µ) = argmin
‖z‖B≤ε
‖µ− z‖2Σ−1 = argmin‖z‖2≤ε
‖µ− z‖22,
gives zΣ(µ) = min(ε, ‖µ‖2) µ‖µ‖2 , and
µ− zΣ(µ) = max(0, ‖µ‖2 − ε‖µ‖2 )µ.
From this expression, we can see that when ε > ‖µ‖2, the Adversarial Signal-to-Noise Ratio of
Pµ,Σ is 2‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖2 = 0. Hence, no classifier can achieve accuracy better than 12 . Below we only
consider the case when ε < ‖µ‖2.
Recall that we want to compare the minimax rate in adversarial and standard setting. As we showed
earlier, the minimax rates are O(exp(−12‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖22) dn) and O(exp(−12‖µ‖22) dn) respectively. The
ratio between the two quantities equals to:
exp(−12‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖22) dn
exp(−12‖µ− zΣ(µ)‖22) dn
= exp(
1
2
((‖µ‖2 − ε)2 − ‖µ‖22)) = exp(ε‖µ‖2 −
1
2
ε2). (15)
Since 0 ≤ ε < ‖µ‖2, we have
ε‖µ‖2 − 1
2
ε2 = ε(‖µ‖2 − 1
2
ε) ∈
[
1
2
ε‖µ‖2, ε‖µ‖2
]
.
Equipped with the above relation, we are in the position of establishing Proposition 5.1.
• When ε ≤ O( 1‖µ‖2 ), one has
ε‖µ‖2 − 1
2
ε2 ≤ ε‖µ‖2 ≤ O(1),
thereby, the adversarial rate is at most exp(O(1)) = O(1) times slower than the standard rate.
• When ‖µ‖2 ≥ Ω(log d) and ε ≥ Ω( log d‖µ‖2 ), we conclude
ε‖µ‖2 − 1
2
ε2 ≥ 1
2
ε‖µ‖2 ≥ Ω(log d),
the adversarial rate can be slower than the standard rate by an Ω(exp(log d)) = Ω(poly(d))
factor.
• When ‖µ‖2 ≥ Ω(
√
d) and ε ≥ Ω( d‖µ‖2 ), it is guaranteed that
ε‖µ‖2 − 1
2
ε2 ≥ 1
2
ε‖µ‖2 ≥ Ω(d),
therefore, the adversarial rate can be slower than the standard rate by an Ω(exp(d)) factor.
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C Improved analysis when Σ is known
Meticulous readers may find a tiny gap between our bounds: the upper bound in Theorem 3.1 is
OP
(
e−
1
8
r2 · r · dn
)
, while the lower bound above gives ΩP
(
e−
1
8
r2 · 1r · dn
)
. Since the dominant factor
is e−
1
8
r2 and r = Ω(1), this difference is only in a lower order term. This gap is due to the fact that
Li et al. (2017) assumed the covariance matrix Σ is known to the learner. In this section, we will
prove that under the same assumption, there is a modified version of Algorithm 1 that achieves the
truly optimal rate which matches the lower bound even with lower order term in r.
The only modification we made in Algorithm 1 is to replace the sample covariance matrix by the
true covariance Σ. The modified algorithm is presented below in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 An improved estimator for w0 when Σ is known
Input: Data pairs {(xi, yi)}ni=1.
Output: ŵ.
Step 1: Define µ̂ and Σ̂ as
µ̂ :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
yixi, Σ̂ := Σ.
Step 2: Solve for ẑ in the following
ẑ := z
Σ̂
(µ̂) = argmin
‖z‖B≤ε
‖µ̂− z‖2
Σ̂−1 .
Step 3: Define ŵ := Σ̂−1(µ̂− ẑ).
Theorem C.1. For the (‖ · ‖B, ε) adversary, suppose the adversarial signal-to-noise ratio
AdvSNRB,ε(µ,Σ) = r, then the excess risk of fŵ defined in Algorithm 3 is upper bounded by
RB,εµ,Σ(fŵ)−RB,εµ,Σ∗ ≤ OP
(
e−
1
8
r2 · 1
r
· d
n
)
.
This improved rate can be proved by some simple modification to the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof. We demonstrate that in this setting, there is a stronger upper bound δn = OP
(
1
r · dn
)
and
the rest of proof follows the same as that of Theorem 3.1. To this end, let us recall that by Lemma
6.3 and one has the decomposition,
‖ŵ‖Σδn = −1
2
(‖w0‖Σ − ‖ŵ‖Σ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+wT0 (ẑ − zΣ(µ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
−1
2
‖ẑ − zΣ(µ)‖2Σ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
+
1
2
‖(Σ− Σ̂)ŵ + (µ̂− µ)‖2Σ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
T4
.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1, we shall establish that
T1 ≤ 0, T2 ≤ 0, T3 ≤ 0, T4 ≤ OP
(
d
n
)
.
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Note that the only difference here is that we can now give a tighter upper bound for T4: OP
(
d
n
)
instead of OP
(
r2 dn
)
.
Since Σ = Σˆ, by Lemma 6.1, we have
T4 =
1
2
‖(Σ− Σ̂)ŵ + (µ̂− µ)‖2Σ−1 =
1
2
‖(µ̂− µ)‖2Σ−1 = OP
(
d
n
)
. (16)
Hence, we have proved that T4 = OP
(
d
n
)
, and
δn = OP
(
1
r
· d
n
)
.
Therefore we have completed the proof.
D Proof of Lemma 6.3
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Recall that our goal is to establish
‖ŵ‖Σδn = ‖ŵ‖Σ‖w0‖Σ −
(
ŵTµ− ε‖ŵ‖B∗
)
= −1
2
(‖w0‖Σ − ‖ŵ‖Σ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+wT0 (ẑ − zΣ(µ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
−1
2
‖ẑ − zΣ(µ)‖2Σ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
+
1
2
‖(Σ− Σ̂)ŵ + (µ̂− µ)‖2Σ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
T4
.
(17)
Since ŵ = Σ̂−1(µ̂− z
Σ̂
(µ̂)), by Theorem 2.1, fŵ is the optimal robust classifier for Pµ̂,Σ̂, therefore,
one can observe
ŵT µ̂− ε‖ŵ‖B∗
‖ŵ‖
Σ̂
= ‖ŵ‖
Σ̂
.
Hence, direct calculations yield
‖ŵ‖Σδn = ‖w0‖Σ‖ŵ‖Σ − ‖ŵ‖2Σ̂ − ŵ
T (µ− µ̂)
= ‖w0‖Σ‖ŵ‖Σ − (µ̂− ẑ)T Σ̂−1(µ̂− ẑ) + (µ̂− ẑ)T Σ̂−1(µ̂− µ)
= ‖w0‖Σ‖ŵ‖Σ + ŵT (ẑ − µ).
Now by use of the relation µ = Σw0 + zΣ(µ), we can further obtain
‖ŵ‖Σδn = ‖w0‖Σ‖ŵ‖Σ + ŵT (ẑ − Σw0 − zΣ(µ))
= ‖w0‖Σ‖ŵ‖Σ − ŵTΣw0 + ŵT (ẑ − zΣ(µ))
= −1
2
(‖w0‖Σ − ‖ŵ‖Σ)2 + 1
2
‖w0‖2Σ +
1
2
‖ŵ‖2Σ − ŵTΣw0 + ŵT (ẑ − zΣ(µ))
= T1 +
1
2
(ŵ − w0)TΣ(ŵ − w0) + wT0 (ẑ − zΣ(µ)) + (ŵ − w0)T (ẑ − zΣ(µ))
= T1 +
1
2
(ŵ − w0)TΣ(ŵ − w0) + T2 + (ŵ − w0)T (ẑ − zΣ(µ)),
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where the last equality invokes the definitions in expression (17). To finish the proof, we make the
observation about Σ(ŵ − w0) in the following
Σ(ŵ − w0) = (Σ− Σ̂)ŵ + (Σ̂ŵ − Σw0)
= (Σ− Σ̂)ŵ︸ ︷︷ ︸
U1
+ (µ̂− µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
U2
− (ẑ − zΣ(µ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
U3
:= U1 + U2 − U3.
Therefore, putting everything together and rearranging terms, it is guaranteed that
‖ŵ‖Σδn = T1 + T2 + 1
2
(ŵ − w0)TΣ(ŵ − w0) + (ŵ − w0)T (ẑ − zΣ(µ))
= T1 + T2 +
1
2
(Σ(ŵ − w0))TΣ−1(Σ(ŵ − w0)) + (Σ(ŵ − w0))TΣ−1(ẑ − zΣ(µ))
= T1 + T2 +
1
2
(U1 + U2 − U3)TΣ−1(U1 + U2 − U3) + (U1 + U2 − U3)Σ−1U3
= T1 + T2 +
1
2
(U1 + U2 − U3)TΣ−1(U1 + U2 + U3)
= T1 + T2 − 1
2
UT3 Σ
−1U3 +
1
2
(U1 + U2)
TΣ−1(U1 + U2)
= T1 + T2 + T3 + T4.
Thus we have finished the proof.
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